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The Leader of the Free World as the Leader of Mass Detention:
Responsive, Short-Term Policies to Ameliorate the Intersecting Crises of
COVID-19 and Mass Detention Within the United States
Haley Brooks*
INTRODUCTION
Reformation of the American criminal justice system has been at the
forefront of American public and scholarly discourse in recent years. Often, such
discourse surrounds the epidemic of mass incarceration, as the United States
maintains the highest prison population rate of any country in the world,
measuring 716 incarcerated persons per 100,000 people.1 However, in addition to
being the world leader of mass incarceration, the United States is also the world
leader in mass detention, as it maintains the largest number of detained noncitizens in the world.2
The United States’ status as the world leader in mass detention was
cemented well before the racial and xenophobic undertones of Donald Trump’s 2016
presidential campaign.3 Notably, legislation enacted and policies enforced during
the three presidential administrations that preceded President Trump’s
administration have helped lay the foundation for the American mass detention
regime that exists today. In the 1990s, President Bill Clinton signed the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which “required the
mandatory detention of non-citizens convicted of a wide range of offenses, including
minor drug offenses,”4 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which “increase[d] penalties on immigrants who had
violated U.S. law in some way.”5 Furthermore, in the aftermath of 9/11,
immigration enforcement was pushed under the broad umbrella of terrorism
prevention when President George W. Bush signed the Homeland Security Act,
resulting in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its
many agencies, including the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement

*
1

2

3

4

5

J.D., Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2022.
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People Up at a Higher Rate than Any Other Country, WASH. POST
(July 7, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-lockspeople-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-any-other-country/.
Kathryn Kurichety, Deliberate Endangerment: Detention of Noncitizens During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 68
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 118, 127 (2020).
See Tom Jacobs, Racism, Xenophobia, and Trump's Win, PAC. STANDARD (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://psmag.com/news/racism-xenophobia-and-trumps-win (discussing the role that economic anxiety,
racial issues, and xenophobia played in President Trump’s 2016 electoral victory).
Analysis of Immigration Detention Policies, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/analysis-immigrationdetention-policies (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
Dara Lind, The Disastrous, Forgotten 1996 Law that Created Today’s Immigration Problem, VOX (Apr. 28,
2016, 8:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-immigration.
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(ICE).6 Lastly, President Barack Obama was nicknamed “Deporter in Chief” by
several immigrant-rights advocates, as a result of the at least three million “mass
deportations” that occurred during his presidency.7 Altogether, this legislative and
executive backdrop has contributed to the development of America’s mass detention
regime, and the increase in the average daily population of detained immigrants
from about 7,000 in 1994, to 19,000 in 2001, to more than 50,000 in 2019.8
Despite the previous presidential administrations’ lack of blamelessness, the
Trump administration was uniquely positioned in the context of the United States’
status as the world leader in mass detention, as the COVID-19 pandemic
exacerbated various issues within the American mass detention regime.
Specifically, the United States’ mass detention regime has proven to be inept at
ameliorating and preventing COVID-19 outbreaks within its overcrowded
immigration detention facilities.9 That being said, the COVID-19 pandemic has
brought the consequences of the United States’ status as the world leader in mass
detention further to the forefront of the public consciousness, as COVID-19’s recent
impact on immigration detention facilities has renewed some legal scholars’ fervent
calls to abolish ICE.10 Conversely, the Trump administration, the subsequent Biden
administration, and other relevant government authorities have remained resistant
to abolition, and instead have carried out various immigration and detention
policies amid the COVID-19 pandemic.11 Written during mid-to-late 2020, amid
some of the darkest and most controversial moments of the COVID-19 pandemic,
and while Donald Trump was still President of the United States, this Note will
mostly focus on the effects of the Trump administration’s policies. Accordingly, this
Note will argue that several current immigration and detention policies will not
only exacerbate the health concerns of COVID-19 within immigration detention
facilities but will also exacerbate mass detention in the long run. Thus, the
6

7

8

9

10

11

Ted Hesson, Five Ways Immigration System Changed After 9/11, ABC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2013, 7:13 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/ways-immigration-system-changed-911/story?id=17231590.
Laura Barrón-López & Alex Thompson, Biden Under Fire for Mass Deportations Under Obama, POLITICO
(July 17, 2019, 5:03 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/12/biden-immigration-2020-1411691.
Immigration Detention 101: The United States Government Maintains the World’s Largest Immigration
Detention System, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/issues/detention101 (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
See Tom Jawetz & Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, Data on the Coronavirus Outbreak in Immigration Detention
Offer More Questions, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 16, 2020, 9:01 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2020/06/16/486338/data-coronavirus-outbreakimmigration-detention-offer-questions-answers/ (noting that, as of June 2020, the minimal data provided by
ICE indicates that positive COVID-19 test rates in detention facilities “continue[]to rise on a steep
trajectory”).
See Kurichety, supra note 2, at 128 (proposing abolishing immigration detention and replacing it with “an
immigration system that respects the humanity of noncitizens”); see also Shiu-Ming Cheer, Moving Toward
Transformation: Abolitionist Reforms and the Immigrants’ Rights Movement, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
68, 71–72 (2020) (proposing “abolitionist reforms” to the United States’ immigrant detention system, which
would include “defund[ing] ICE altogether”).
See Michelle Hackman, Where Trump and Biden Stand on Immigration, Border Wall, and ICE, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 17, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-trump-and-biden-stand-on-immigrationborder-wall-and-ice-11600335000 (noting that President Trump has praised ICE throughout his
presidency).
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following analysis will propose responsive, short-term reforms for the American
mass detention regime that will address the health concerns created by COVID-19
within immigration detention facilities and help to reduce mass detention.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I of this analysis will provide a
background of how the two crises of COVID-19 and mass detention have
intersected. Part II will provide an overview of three notorious policies that the
Trump administration sought to carry out amid the COVID-19 pandemic—
specifically focusing on the Trump administration’s policy of making families choose
between either remaining united in indefinite detention or placing children with
relatives or foster families, the Trump administration’s continued practice of
interfacility transfers, and the Trump administration’s efforts to increase various
immigration application fees.12 Part III will critique such policies. Part IV will
respond to the abolitionist reforms proposed by legal scholars and immigrant-rights
activists amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, Part V will further emphasize why
neither the abolitionist reforms nor the Trump administration’s policies will
effectuate any immediate, necessary alleviation of the intersecting crises of COVID19 and mass detention. Instead, several responsive, short-term reforms should be
considered amid the COVID-19 pandemic—including an end to family detention, a
cessation of interfacility transfers of detainees, and an abandonment of efforts to
increase various immigration application fees.
I. COVID-19’S WRATH UPON THE AMERICAN MASS DETENTION REGIME
To understand how the two crises of COVID-19 and mass detention have
intersected, it is important to acknowledge the current conditions that are plaguing
the thousands of detained immigrants who make up the American mass detention
population. Reports of overcrowding within these detention facilities existed before
the pandemic. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2019 and heading into fiscal
year 2020, the average daily population in detention was more than 500,000—
spread throughout approximately 200 immigration detention facilities across the
United States.13 For example, in 2019, a manager at a detention facility in McAllen,
Texas, described the overcrowding as “a ticking time bomb,” as released photos from
DHS's Office of Inspector General showed fifty-one female migrants being held in a
cell made for forty males, and seventy-one male migrants being held in a cell built
for forty-one females.14 Consequently, even before the pandemic, it was common for
12

13
14

See Nicole Narea, The Trump Administration’s Choice for Immigrant Families in Detention: Separate or
Risk Covid-19, VOX (July 29, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/7/29/21340457/
(discussing the Trump Administration’s family detention policies in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic);
Victor Valdez Gonzalez, USCIS Fee Increases Effective October 2, 2020, IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. CTR. (Aug.
2020), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/revised_uscis_fee_increases_october_2020.pdf
(discussing the impacts of DHS’s decision to reduce fee waivers and increase costs for various immigration
applications).
The United States Government Maintains the World’s Largest Immigration Detention System, supra note 8.
US Migrant Centres: Photos Show 'Dangerous' Overcrowding, BBC (July 2, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48842434.
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serious illness to spread throughout immigration detention facilities.15 Between
September 2018 and August 2019, over “700 migrants were infected with mumps
after being exposed to the disease in detention [facilities].”16 Also, in late 2019,
despite the overcrowded conditions of these facilities amid the impending flu
season, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) refused to administer free flu
vaccines to detainees.17 Three detainees ultimately died from the flu in 2019,
including one teenage boy who passed away in a “small concrete holding cell . . .
after not receiving proper medical attention.”18
Considering this background, when COVID-19 began to wreak havoc on the
United States in March 2020, detention facilities faced an initial issue of being
unable to, at the bare minimum, carry out the CDC’s recommended social
distancing measures among the hundreds of detainees locked within these
facilities19 and among the facility staff “who [were] the most likely vectors to
introduce COVID-19 into detainee populations.”20 Furthermore, even though
detainees are required to remain in close quarters amid the global outbreak of
COVID-19—a virus that “spread[s] through close contact and . . . live[s] on surfaces
for days”—they also continue to have limited access to hand sanitizer and soap.21 In
fact, detainees are often forced to pay for necessities, including hand sanitizer and
soap, which means that many detainees have to work in the kitchens, laundry
rooms, or cleaning crews of detention facilities to make money.22 However, such
minimal opportunities to earn money are often inadequate to pay for necessities, as
“[a] full day's work is not enough to buy a bar of soap at detention center
commissaries.”23
While the previous information paints a broad picture of COVID-19’s impact
on the American mass detention population as a whole, it is worth giving special
attention to a couple of alarming, first-hand testimonies about conditions at ICE
detention facilities amid the pandemic. Notably, in September 2020, Dawn Wooten,
a former nurse at the Irwin County Detention Center in Ocilla, Georgia, filed a
twenty-seven page whistleblower complaint, alleging various counts of “medical
neglect” within the detention center that “houses immigrants detained by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and is run by LaSalle Corrections, a private

15
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20
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Conditions in Migrant Detention Centers, AM. OVERSIGHT (July 31, 2020),
https://www.americanoversight.org/investigation/conditions-in-migrant-detention-centers.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jorge Lowree, Aaron Reichlin-Melnick & Walter Ewing, The Impact of Covid-19 on Noncitizens and Across
the U.S. Immigration System, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/impact-covid-19-us-immigration-system.
Kurichety, supra note 2, at 124.
Id. at 120, 124.
Id. at 124.
Id.
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company that operates similar facilities in three Southern states.”24 Wooten was
demoted in July as a result of what she claimed was a “retaliatory reprimand” after
she took time off of work to await her COVID-19 test results.25 Among her COVID19 related claims, Wooten alleged that the facility “refus[ed] to test detainees for
COVID-19 . . . allow[ed] employees to work while symptomatic and awaiting
COVID-19 test results, with[eld] information . . . about who ha[d] tested positive,
underreport[ed] COVID-19 cases, and allow[ed] the transfer of detained
immigrants, including those who ha[d] tested positive for the virus.”26
Furthermore, the Otay Mesa Detention Center—a detention center run by
CoreCivic in San Diego, California—provides another stark example, as it had one
of the largest COVID-19 outbreaks among ICE detention facilities.27 Firsthand
accounts from detainees revealed that, as COVID-19 began to spread throughout
the country and within ICE detention facilities in late March and early April 2020,
facility management did not implement social distancing measures, despite having
an average daily population of approximately 956 detainees heading into 2020.28
Despite such failures to maintain social distancing, the facility did not provide
detainees with gloves or facemasks.29 Thus, some detainees assembled makeshift
masks by putting together pieces of t-shirt fabric, daily sanitary pads, and hair
ties.30 Eventually the conditions at ICE's eleventh-busiest detention center resulted
in 35 detainees going on a 5-day hunger strike in April 2020, 31 201 detainees
testing positive for COVID-19 as of December 2020, and 1 detainee passing away
from COVID-19 complications.32
Various similar firsthand accounts have made it evident that the American
mass detention regime has been incapable of ameliorating or preventing COVID-19
outbreaks within detention facilities. Thus, in the face of mounting protests and
lawsuits, ICE has released several detainees who are considered medically highrisk.33 Nevertheless, as of December 18, 2020, ICE continued to maintain a detained
population of 15,993.34 Also, as of June 5, 2022, 11 detainees had died of COVID-19,
24

25
26
27
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31
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33

34

Rachel Treisman, Whistleblower Alleges ‘Medical Neglect’, Questionable Hysterectomies of ICE Detainee,
NPR (Sept. 16, 2020, 4:43 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/16/913398383/whistleblower-alleges-medicalneglect-questionable-hysterectomies-of-ice-detaine.
Id.
Id.
See Elliot Spagat, How the Coronavirus Spread through Otay Mesa Detention Center in San Diego, CBS8
(July 19, 2020, 11:58 AM), https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/how-the-coronavirusspread-through-otay-mesa-detention-center-in-san-diego/509-15a45f6c-b25b-4eb1-a35d-fa60613cd058.
Id.
See Patricia Sulbarán Lovera, Coronavirus: Immigration Detention Centres in Crises, BBC (May 1, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52476131.
See id.
Spagat, supra note 27.
ICE Guidance on COVID-19, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus (last visited
Dec. 22, 2020).
See Dan Glaun, How ICE Data Undercounts COVID-19 Victims, PBS (Aug. 11, 2020),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-ice-data-undercounts-covid-19-victims/.
ICE Guidance on COVID-19, supra note 32.
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and 43,658 detainees tested positive for the virus since the start of the pandemic.35
But it is important to note that ICE does not keep track of, or report, the COVID-19
deaths that occur after a detainee has been released from a detention facility, no
matter how close in time the death was to a detainee's release.36 The continued
COVID-19-related deaths and outbreaks within these detention facilities make it
evident that various reforms are necessary to ameliorate the “tinderbox” that is the
American mass detention regime.37
II. STOKING THE FIRE OF COVID-19 AND MASS DETENTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S IMMIGRATION POLICIES AMID THE PANDEMIC
Although the dismal analysis of COVID-19’s impact on the American mass
detention regime might indicate otherwise, the federal government has not sat idly
by while COVID-19 has wreaked its havoc. Rather, the Trump administration
sought to enact several immigration policies amid the pandemic, resulting in at
least forty-eight policy changes to the American immigration system.38 Some
individuals might consider such various policy changes to be reasonable, necessary
responses to the spread of COVID-19 throughout the United States and beyond its
borders. Others might argue that a portion of such policy changes were issued
merely to further the Trump administration’s tough stances on immigration, which
had been at the helm of the former president’s policy platform since his 2016
presidential campaign.39 Nevertheless, while the Trump administration’s motives
can—and most certainly should—be debated, the impact of the policies are
unarguably apparent, as these policies have affected “almost every facet of the
immigration system.”40 Thus, the following overview will give specific attention to
three policies that were uniquely positioned within the intersection of COVID-19
and mass detention: the Trump administration’s family detention policy, the Trump
administration's continued practice of interfacility transfers, and the Trump
administration’s efforts to increase various immigration application fees.
The first policy to consider is the Trump administration’s family detention
policy. It is no secret that the Trump administration’s previous family detention
policies were prevalent in public and legal discourse even before the COVID-19
pandemic began.41 Specifically, in 2018, the Trump administration sparked a
35
36

37
38

39
40
41

Id.
See, e.g., Glaun, supra note 33 (noting the story of Oscar Lopez Acosta, a diabetic detainee who contracted
COVID-19 and eventually died two weeks after being released from ICE custody).
Cheer, supra note 10, at 75.
Danilo Zak, Immigration-Related Executive Actions During the COVID-19 Pandemic, NAT’L IMMIGR. POL’Y F.
(Sept. 18, 2020), https://immigrationforum.org/article/immigration-related-executive-actions-during-thecovid-19-pandemic/.
See id.
Id.
See, e.g., Muzaffar Chisti and Sarah Pierce, Trump Administration’s New Indefinite Family Detention
Policy: Deterrence Not Guaranteed, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trump-administration-new-indefinite-family-detention-policy
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national outcry when it opted for “the nuclear option in the effort to discourage
immigrants from unlawfully entering the United States”—the zero tolerance
policy.42 Generally, this policy resulted in “unlawful immigrants being taken into
federal criminal custody, at which point their children [were] considered
unaccompanied alien minors and [were] taken away” from them.43 Not surprisingly,
this policy, which had also been considered—although never enacted—by the Bush
and Obama administrations, elicited fierce backlash.44 As a result, the Trump
administration claimed that it put an end to its family separation policy in 2018.45
Nevertheless, despite the catastrophe that was the Trump administration’s
previous family separation policy, it had been “carry[ing] out what immigration
advocates call[ed] a new kind of family separation” amid the COVID-19 pandemic.46
In June 2020, Judge Gee of the Central District Court of Los Angeles ordered the
release of all children held in ICE family detention facilities, as she noted that such
facilities are “on fire” amid the continued spread of COVID-19.47 However, Judge
Gee's Order did not cover detained parents, and, in a separate lawsuit, Judge James
Boasberg of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia refused to
order the release of detained parents, as he noted that “a blanket release of all
family units was not necessary at [that] time.”48 Thus, ICE and attorneys
representing over 100 detained immigrant children began negotiations on how to
proceed in light of the relevant court orders.49 Amid such negotiations, the Trump
administration formed a policy that presented detained parents with what it
describes as a “binary choice,” in which detained parents could “[e]ither allow their
children to be placed with relatives or a foster family in the [United States] while
the parents remain detained, or stay together as a family in indefinite detention

42

43
44
45

46
47

48

49

(discussing the Trump administration’s “controversial family-separation practice that drew massive
protest” in 2018).
Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, How Trump Came to Enforce A Practice of Separating Migrant
Families, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/us/politics/family-separationtrump.html.
Id.
See id.
See Jasmine Aguilera, Here’s What to Know About the Status of Family Separation at the U.S. Border,
Which Isn’t Nearly Over, TIME (Sept. 20, 2019, 8:47 PM), https://time.com/5678313/trump-administrationfamily-separation-lawsuits/ (noting that although the Trump administration declared the family separation
policy to be over in June 2018, many children remain separated from their parents).
Narea, supra note 12.
Jacob Soboroff, Despite Judge’s Order, Migrant Children Remain Detained Amid COVID Outbreak, NBC
NEWS (July 23, 2020, 1:11 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/despite-judge-s-ordermigrant-children-remain-detained-amid-covid-n1234705.
Jasmine Aguilera, ‘Family Separation 2.0.’ Parents in ICE Detention Have to Decide Whether to Keep Their
Children or Release Them to Sponsors, TIME (July 27, 2020, 12:08 PM), https://time.com/5866659/iceparents-children-detention-coronavirus-release/.
See Michelle Hackman & Alicia A. Caldwell, Trump Administration, Lawyers for Migrant Children Near
Deal on Choice for Jailed Families, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administrationlawyers-for-migrant-children-near-deal-on-choice-for-jailed-families-11595415602 (last updated July 22,
2020, 8:07 PM).
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and [thus] risk contracting COVID-19” within ICE family detention facilities.50 If
migrant families chose the latter option, the parents waive their children’s rights
under the twenty-three-year-old Flores Settlement—a settlement that “requires
ICE to release migrant children [who have been held] in its custody” for twenty
days.51
The second policy to outline is the Trump administration’s continued practice
of interfacility transfers during the COVID-19 pandemic. First, it is important to
note that the Trump administration is not the first administration to transfer
detainees between the various ICE detention facilities spread throughout the
country; rather, such transfers have long been a part of ICE protocol.52 In fact, a
2011 report by Human Rights Watch noted that, over the course of their stay within
the American mass detention regime, most detainees will be transferred from one
detention facility to another.53 For example, between 1998 and 2010, “over 46% of
transferred detainees were moved at least two times, [and] 3,400 people [were]
transferred ten times or more.”54 Although such transfers are not a new practice
among presidential administrations, the Trump administration is uniquely
positioned in the context of interfacility transfers, as such transfers became a part
of the Trump administration’s efforts to “curb the spread of [COVID-19]” within ICE
detention facilities.55 Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, “while most Americans
ha[d] been [advised] to shelter at home, [ICE] ha[d] [continued to] shuffle[]
hundreds of people in its custody around the country,”56 despite the agency’s
lackluster COVID-19 testing capacity and its inability to carry out adequate social
distancing or provide sanitary products and personal protective equipment (PPE).57
Such transfers have resulted in some detainees being “transferred from California
to Florida, Florida to New Mexico, Arizona to Washington State, [and] Pennsylvania
to Texas.”58
The third policy to outline is the Trump administration’s efforts to increase
the various immigration application fees that are charged by the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). This government agency is tasked
with processing immigration and naturalization applications.59 Under federal law,
50
51
52

53
54
55

56
57

58
59

Narea, supra note 12.
Hackman & Caldwell, supra note 49.
See A Costly Move, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 14, 2001), https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/06/14/costlymove/far-and-frequent-transfers-impede-hearings-immigrant-detainees-united#.
Id.
Id.
Lisa Riordan Seville & Hannah Rappleye, ICE Keeps Transferring Detainees Around the Country, Leading
to COVID-19 Outbreaks, NBC NEWS (May 31, 2020, 6:08 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/ice-keeps-transferring-detainees-around-country-leadingcovid-19-outbreaks-n1212856.
Id.
See Kurichety, supra note 2, at 123, 126 (noting, “The guidance on the need for social distancing and
sanitary living conditions is clear; so is the fact that ICE can provide neither to immigrants in its custody”).
Seville & Rappleye, supra note 55.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, USAGOV, https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/u-s-citizenshipand-immigration-services (last visited Oct. 22, 2020).
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USCIS’s fee structure is subject to review every two years.60 Thus, in July 2020, the
Trump administration concluded its nine-month review of proposed changes to
USCIS’s fee structure and sought to enact several changes that were set to become
effective on October 2, 2020.61 Ultimately, such changes were expected to make it
“twice as expensive to apply to become an American citizen.”62 Namely, the filing fee
for a Form N-400, which is the form that individuals must fill out to apply to
become an American citizen,63 would increase from $640 to $1,160—an eighty-one
percent increase.64 Additionally, the filing fee for a Form N-336, which is the form
that individuals must fill out to request a hearing on a decision in their
naturalization proceedings, would increase “nearly 150[%] to $1,725.”65 It is worth
noting that the changes to USCIS’s fee structure would also result in the
elimination of possible fee waivers for Form N-400 and Form N-336 applications.66
Furthermore, the changes would include a new fifty-dollar filing fee for a Form I589, which is the Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal.67
Consequently, the United States would join only three other countries in the
world—Australia, Fiji, and Iran—that “require asylum seekers, who are often
fleeing from persecution and violence, to pay to apply for protections.”68 These
proposed changes are only a few of the various alterations to USCIS’s fee structure
that the Trump administration sought to enact in 2020.69
III. AN EXERCISE IN INDIFFERENCE AND INEFFECTIVENESS: A CRITIQUE OF THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO THE INTERSECTING CRISES OF
COVID-19 AND MASS DETENTION
Following that overview of three notorious immigration policies that the
Trump administration sought to carry out amid the COVID-19 pandemic, it is
necessary to critique such policies, and in doing so, acknowledge the unique position
of these policies within the context of the American mass detention regime.
Accordingly, the following analysis will demonstrate how each of these three policies
not only exacerbated the health concerns created by COVID-19 within immigration
detention facilities but will also exacerbate the issue of mass detention in the long
run.
60

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

See Claire Hansen, Trump Administration Nearly Doubles Cost to Apply to Become a U.S. Citizen, U.S.
NEWS (July 31, 2020, 12:32 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2020-07-31/trumpadministration-nearly-doubles-cost-to-apply-to-become-a-us-citizen.
See id.
Id.
See Gonzalez, supra note 12, at 1–2.
See Hansen, supra note 60.
Gonzalez, supra note 12, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Hansen, supra note 60.
See Gonzalez, supra note 12 (noting various proposed increases in USCIS’S filing fees, as well as USCIS’s
attempts to reduce various fee waivers).
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First, the Trump administration’s family detention policy will most notably
fail to ameliorate current—or prevent future—COVID-19 outbreaks within
immigration detention facilities and will instead contribute to the issue of mass
detention within the United States. As previously noted, the Trump
administration’s family detention policy has been described as a “binary choice.”70
This is the case as the Trump administration’s policy required detained parents to
“[e]ither allow their children to be placed with relatives or a foster family in the
[United States] while the parents remain detained, or stay together as a family in
indefinite detention and [thus] risk contracting [COVID-19]” within ICE family
detention facilities.71 Despite the first option within this “binary choice,” it would be
logical to assume that most immigrant families likely opted for the second option—
remaining together in indefinite detention.72
Many immigrant families witnessed, and possibly even experienced
firsthand, the unmistakably cruel horrors of the Trump administration's previous
family separation policy. In fact, forever imprinted on the conscience of America—
the country whose Statue of Liberty is etched with the phrases “Mother of Exiles”
and “[g]ive me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe
free”73—will be the infamous pictures of children keeping warm with large foil
sheets as they sit in detention after being separated from their parents,74 as will the
shameful videos of children failing to recognize their parents upon reunification.75
Furthermore, even though the Trump administration ceased its original family
separation policy in 2018,76 “the parents of 545 migrant children still have not been
found, according to court documents.”77 Approximately “60 of these children were
under the age of 5 when they were separated” from their parents.78 Reports indicate
that reunification efforts were “marred by poor record-keeping [that has persisted]
70
71
72

73

74

75

76
77

78

Soboroff, supra note 47.
Narea, supra note 12.
See Soboroff, supra note 47 (noting that “[i]n May 2020, NBC News reported that . . . not a single parent
from the hundreds of families then detained in ICE custody agreed to be separated from their children
when presented with the option”).
The New Colossus, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://www.nps.gov/stli/learn/historyculture/colossus.htm (quoting inscription written by Emma Lazarus).
See Camila Domonoske & Richard Gonzales, What We Know: Family Separation and ‘Zero Tolerance’ at the
Border, NPR (June 19, 2019, 2:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621065383/what-we-know-familyseparation-and-zero-tolerance-at-the-border (discussing the Trump administration’s 2018 family separation
policy, including pictures of detained children keeping themselves warm with large foil sheets in a McAllen,
Texas, detention facility).
See Elizabeth Trovall, ‘My Son is Traumatized’: The Story Behind this Viral Video of Reunited Honduran
Family, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA (Aug. 29, 2019, 1:27 PM),
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/politics/immigration/2018/08/29/302164/my-son-istraumatized-the-story-behind-this-viral-video-of-a-reunited-honduran-family/ (reporting the story of Ever
Reyes-Mejia and his wife, who were separated from their three-year-old son for three months. In the video,
when reunited with his parents, the “traumatized” boy pulls away from his mother, as she cries in Spanish,
“I'm your mommy . . . What happened? Papi, come with me. My son is traumatized.”).
Aguilera, supra note 45.
Caitlin Dickerson, Parents of 545 Children Separated at the Border Cannot be Found, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/us/migrant-children-separated.html.
Id.

2022]

The Leader of the Free World as the Leader of Mass Detention

401

since [reunification efforts] began in the summer of 2018.”79 Reunification efforts
were further frustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic, as the Trump administration
severely restricted any travel through Central American countries, which is where
most of the families live.80 Thus, taken altogether, the logical assumption would be
that as the United States government continues to grapple with the health,
economic, and bureaucratic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the fallout
of the 2020 general election, many immigrant parents will not want to risk being
separated from their children. Rather, many families likely chose to remain
together in indefinite detention—sustaining the high number of detainees who
make up the American mass detention population and increasing the risk of
COVID-19 outbreaks, as the high number of detainees continues to frustrate
lackluster social distancing and sanitary measures.81
Second, the Trump administration’s continued practice of interfacility
transfers amid the COVID-19 pandemic also failed to ameliorate current—or
prevent future—COVID-19 outbreaks within immigration detention facilities.
Rather, this continued practice further contributed to the intersecting crises of
COVID-19 and mass detention. ICE justified these transfers as being a part of its
efforts to “curb the spread of [COVID-19].”82 However, these continued transfers
accomplished the opposite, as “public health specialists have for months warned the
U.S. government that shuffling detainees among immigration detention centers will
expose people to COVID-19 and help spread the disease.”83 Specifically, such
transfers led to COVID-19 outbreaks in various immigration detention facilities
throughout the country—notably, in “Texas, Ohio, Florida, Mississippi, [Virginia,]
and Louisiana, according to attorneys, news reports, and ICE declarations filed in
federal courts.”84
To briefly illustrate the extent of the danger that these transfers posed, it is
worth noting that an interfacility transfer of seventy-four detainees from Florida
and Arizona detention facilities to the Farmville, Virginia detention facility led to “a
super-spreading event, according to emails from ICE and [facility] officials . . . [as
well as] court documents and interviews with more than a dozen detainees at the
[Farmville] facility.”85 Prior to this interfacility transfer, only two detainees had
tested positive for COVID-19 at the Farmville detention facility; however, more
than half of the seventy-four transferred detainees later tested positive after their
arrival to Farmville.86 Consequently, Farmville became one of the “hardest-hit”
79
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detention centers, as 315 detainees would eventually test positive for COVID-19
approximately one month after the seventy-four-detainee transfer.87 Accordingly,
Farmville is only one of the many examples of how interfacility transfers failed to
ameliorate or prevent COVID-19 outbreaks within ICE detention facilities and
failed to relieve the overcrowded immigration detention facilities that make up the
American mass-detention regime.
Finally, the Trump administration’s attempted efforts to increase various
USCIS immigration application fees also failed to ameliorate current—or prevent
future—COVID-19 outbreaks within immigration detention facilities; instead, such
efforts have the potential to further exacerbate mass detention within the United
States. First, this Note uses the phrase “attempted efforts” because, although the
Trump administration’s changes to USCIS’s fee structure were set to become
effective on October 2, 2020, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California blocked these efforts in a recent ruling.88 In this ruling, the
court granted a preliminary injunction filed by eight nonprofit organizations,
consequently putting a temporary, nationwide halt to the proposed fee-structure
changes.89 The basis for the court’s ruling was partly that such changes, which
would have effectively “doubled or tripled application fees for many essential
immigration benefits,” were enacted “arbitrarily without consider[ation] [for]
important concerns . . . including the negative impact the rule would have on lowincome immigrant populations.”90 Notwithstanding this preliminary injunction,
litigation on these proposed changes is likely to continue.91 Thus, it remains
necessary to critique these efforts to increase immigration fees, both in the context
of COVID-19 and mass detention.
USCIS receives a majority of its funding from immigration application
processing fees.92 Thus, as the Trump administration enhanced its immigration
enforcement and deterrence efforts over the past four years, USCIS consistently
suffered from budget shortfalls, as it was not processing enough immigration
applications, and was thus not receiving enough fees to remain afloat.93
Accordingly, the COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated these budget shortfalls,
as immigration was obviously further restricted throughout the pandemic.94
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Consequently, USCIS almost furloughed more than 13,000 employees.95 However,
USCIS temporarily averted these furloughs, and instead, implemented “aggressive
spending reduction measures [that] will impact all agency operations, including
naturalizations.”96 These potential furloughs and “aggressive spending reduction
measures”97 have the potential to “halt all immigration processing,” or at the very
least, drastically slow an already time-consuming process.98 Thus, the logical
assumption would be that more immigrants might have to wait longer in detention
as they wait for their immigration matters to be processed, increasing their risk of
contracting COVID-19 within these detention facilities. Additionally, it is important
to note that many detained immigrants, who can hardly afford to pay for necessities
such as soap at detention center commissaries,99 will also be unable to afford the
various increased fees that would arise in the application process.100 Altogether,
these attempted efforts to further increase some of USCIS’s fees accelerate a cruel,
counterproductive feedback loop that results in less funding for USCIS, slower
immigration application processing, more detained immigrants waiting out the
slowed processing period in detention, and more detained immigrants risking
illness from COVID-19.
IV. ABOLISHMENT OF ICE: DESIRABLE IN THE LONG-TERM, HARSH
IMPRACTICALITIES IN THE SHORT-TERM
For many people, the natural reaction to the gasoline that COVID-19 has
poured upon the fire that is the American mass-detention regime might be to burn
the system down altogether, and thus abolish the current state of immigration
detention as we know it. While this Note does not propose abolition, the proposition
is nevertheless worth briefly noting, as the COVID-19 pandemic has renewed
fervent calls to abolish ICE. For example, Karlyn Kurichety, an immigration
attorney, has noted that the COVID-19 pandemic should raise questions about “why
[the United States should] continue . . . detaining noncitizens in civil confinement at
all.”101 In Kurichety’s view, “simply paroling detained noncitizens throughout the
duration of [the] pandemic is not enough; [rather, the United States] must abolish
immigration detention and build an immigration system that respects the humanity
95
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of noncitizens.”102 Legal scholar Shiu-Ming Cheer has echoed a similar sentiment,
as she has argued, “to actually advance systemic changes . . . the types of demands
and campaigns that immigrants’ rights groups should put forward at this moment
of rupture must be ‘abolitionist’ reforms [which would] move us toward ending all
forms of structural oppression and address the root of these oppressions.”103 Thus,
Cheer claims, “limited fixes . . . only nominally move the needle” and “legitimize the
idea that ICE as an institution should continue to exist.”104
While such sentiments are most certainly justified, especially given the harsh
realities of the American mass detention regime that COVID-19 has brought even
more to the forefront of the public consciousness, they overlook the many harsh
truths about this current moment within American politics and society. Accordingly,
if legal scholars and immigrant-rights advocates solely adopt abolition-oriented
proposals, the intersecting crises of COVID-19 and mass detention will continue to
go unresolved. First, as previously noted, the Trump administration remained
resistant to the notion of abolishing ICE.105 In fact, the National Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Council, a union representing “5,000 federal immigration
officers and law enforcement support staff,” endorsed Trump’s 2016 candidacy for
President, which would mark the first time this union had ever endorsed a
presidential candidate.106 Nevertheless, conservatives are not the only lawmakers
who tolerate the systemic nature of ICE’s immigration detention, as many
progressives have also resisted the notion of abolition.107 In fact, while many of the
2020 Democratic presidential candidates noted that they believe ICE needs
restructuring and reforms, Senator Bernie Sanders and former New York Mayor
Bill de Blasio were the only candidates to expressly endorse the notion of abolishing
ICE.108 Most notably, President Joe Biden unequivocally does not endorse
abolishing ICE.109 Furthermore, a majority of Americans have opposed abolishing
ICE, as a 2018 Politico poll indicated that 54% of voters believe the federal
government should maintain ICE.110 Broken down by political parties, 43% of
102
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Democrats supported the proposition of abolishing ICE, whereas 79% of
Republicans and 54% of Independents oppose abolition.111
V. RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM AT HAND: NECESSARY, SHORT-TERM POLICIES
TO AMELIORATE THE INTERSECTING CRISES OF COVID-19 AND MASS
DETENTION
The intersecting crises of COVID-19 and mass detention, along with the
current unlikelihood of ICE’s abolishment, require consideration of responsive,
short-term reforms to the American mass detention regime. Such reforms center on
an end to family detention, a cessation of interfacility transfers of detainees, and an
abandonment of efforts to increase immigration application fees. These responsive,
short-term reforms remain relevant in the context of the past Trump administration
and in the Biden administration, as President Biden has transitioned into office
with several issues to address while facing a deeply divided nation and Congress.112
First, family detention should cease, and instead, a program similar to the
2016 Family Case Management Program (FCMP) should be considered. FCMP was
a pilot program launched by the Obama administration,113 and some legal scholars
have proposed it as an alternative to the Trump administration’s previous family
detention and separation policies.114 However, programs such as FCMP have not
been explored within the context of COVID-19. Note that FCMP was launched late
in President Obama’s second term, and the Trump administration discontinued
FCMP in 2017;115 thus, research on FCMP’s efficacy is somewhat limited.
Nevertheless, according to a 2017 DHS Inspector General Report, FCMP assisted
954 immigrant families, and “overall compliance in the five cities where [it] was
launched was 99[%] for ICE check-ins and appointments, and 100[%] for attendance
in court hearings.”116
A new family immigration program should mirror aspects of FCMP, such as
its “counseling service[s],” which would consist of caseworkers who assist families in
ensuring their attendance at immigration hearings, navigating the American
immigration system's bureaucratic red tape, and obtaining “housing, healthcare,
and schooling [for children]” while families await decisions on their immigration
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claims.117 However, unlike the previous FCMP pilot program, which launched in
only five cities,118 the new family immigration program should be uniformly
implemented throughout the United States. Such uniform implementation is
necessary as COVID-19 outbreaks have been prevalent throughout the various
immigration detention facilities across the country, not just facilities in major
metropolitan areas.119 Also, unlike the pilot FCMP, which typically conceptualized
“families” as “female-led households: women who entered the country with their
children,” the new family immigration program should conceptualize “family” as a
family unit that can include two parents or a single parent.120 Operation of FCMP
amounted to $36 per day per family.121 Obviously, a newer, more merciful family
immigration program would cost more than the pilot FCMP; however, presidential
administrations have shown time and again that they are willing to throw money at
ICE and other actors within the American mass-detention regime.122 Investing in a
new family immigration program that provides oversight and assistance would help
to ensure immigrants’ compliance with legal responsibilities while simultaneously
facilitating their safety and security outside of the American mass-detention
regime. Thus, an end to family detention could cut at the persistent threat of
COVID-19 outbreaks within these facilities, as well as the deeply systemic issue of
mass detention within the United States.
The second responsive, short-term reform is an end to interfacility transfers.
Although ICE has claimed that such transfers are a part of its efforts to “curb the
spread of [COVID-19],” evidence indicates that such transfers are not only failing to
ameliorate the spread of COVID-19, but they are also failing to relieve the
overcrowded immigration detention facilities that make up the American massdetention regime.123 Public health experts, such as Carlos Franco-Paredes, an
infectious disease doctor studying COVID-19 outbreaks in correction settings, have
noted that “it is not possible to transfer detainees safely in the current
environment.”124 Moreover, Franco-Paredes further explained, “[i]f you’re moving
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people, particularly from an area where there is an ongoing outbreak, even though
you sequester them for two weeks or so, there is [nevertheless] contact with people,”
and consequently, ICE is “basically spreading the problems.”125 Thus, although one
might assume that such transfers could be beneficial to a detainee by allowing them
to enjoy necessary services or improved conditions at a different facility, COVID-19
outbreaks—such as the one in Farmville—indicate that interfacility transfers can
increase the likelihood of detainees contracting COVID-19.126 It is also important to
note that ICE does not always test detainees for COVID-19 before facilitating a
transfer; rather, ICE policy has typically been to merely screen detainees for fevers
and other symptoms, even though the Center for Disease Control (CDC) has
repeatedly emphasized that someone can be positive for, and consequently spread,
COVID-19, even if they are asymptomatic.127 Interfacility transfers have the proven
potential to contribute to, and/or worsen, COVID-19 outbreaks within detention
facilities, even though some government officials might argue that interfacility
transfers have the potential to relieve the overcrowded conditions plaguing
immigration detention facilities.128 Thus, Congress should enact legislation, such as
the End Transfers of Detained Immigrants Act (“Act”), which would require ICE to
no longer transfer detainees between ICE facilities or federal, state, and local
prisons.129 This Act would also require ICE to release detainees, “if physical
distancing inside ICE facilities is not possible, [in order] . . . to ensure adherence to
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines.”130
Third, instead of allocating resources to frivolous litigation aimed at
defending USCIS’s fee increases, any attempts to increase USCIS immigration
application fees should be abandoned. Since the federal government has chosen to
fund USCIS partly through immigration application fees, it is impractical to expect
this organization to be equipped to do its job if its sustenance is in part dependent
upon a population that is sometimes too poor to even buy hand sanitizer or soap in
detention center commissaries.131 Fee increases will only lead to fewer immigrants
being able to afford their application and filing fees, which leads to less funding for
USCIS.132 Less funding for USCIS could lead to thousands of employee furloughs,
which will slow an already arduous immigration process.133 Thus, as previously
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noted, increased fees further accelerate a counterproductive feedback loop that
results in less funding for USCIS, slower immigration application processing, more
detained immigrants waiting out the slowed processing period in detention, and
more detained immigrants risking illness from COVID-19.134 It is worth briefly
noting that while this Note is proposing abandonment of any attempts to increase
immigration application fees, there is a potential argument that the intersecting
crises of COVID-19 and mass detention should force lawmakers to reconsider how
USCIS is funded altogether. Yes, one might reasonably expect the agency to charge
some fees for immigration applications, but lawmakers should be troubled when an
agency is so strapped for funding that it seeks to double the cost to apply to become
a citizen amid a global pandemic,135 threatens to furlough nearly 70% of its
workforce amid a global pandemic,136 and pushes for the United States to become
one of only four countries in the world to charge asylum seekers for filing fees amid
a global pandemic.137
CONCLUSION
This Note is cognizant of the fact that COVID-19 not only impacted detained
immigrants in the United States, but also took the lives of over
1,005,131Americans.138 Nevertheless, this Note has chosen to focus on the
intersecting crises of COVID-19 and American mass detention because there comes
a point when routine ineffectiveness, indifference, and complacency in the status
quo reaches cruelty, and the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the American
mass-detention regime is passed that point.
Thus, this Note’s responsive reform of ending family detention would call
upon the federal government to rethink its seemingly innate, callous tendency to
separate migrant children from their families. The Trump administration’s “binary
choice” policy, or “family separation 2.0,”139 is merely an invitation for mass
detention because a “choice” to separate from one’s child and trust a bureaucratic
system that has previously led to at least 545 migrant children remaining separated
from their parents is no choice at all.140 Additionally, this Note’s responsive reform
of ending interfacility transfers calls upon the government to reconcile with its
innate tendency to treat detained immigrants as if they are disposable, by
transferring them from facility to facility, simply because the American massdetention regime might lack necessary services or adequate space for detainees.
Finally, this Note’s responsive proposal to abandon any attempts to increase
134
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USCIS’s immigration application fees should encourage lawmakers to rethink how
deeply counterintuitive it is that the agency entrusted with immigration processing
is so reliant upon fees from a population that consists of many people who might be
fleeing violence or poverty, or who can hardly afford to buy soap from detention
center commissaries.141 Each of these reforms not only cuts at the persistent threat
of COVID-19 outbreaks within immigration detention facilities, but also at the
deeply systemic issue of mass detention within the United States.
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